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CIVIL PROCEDURE
William R. Forrester, Jr. *
JURISDICTION IN PERSONAM
By Act No. 418 of 1987, the Louisiana Legislature amended section
3201 of Title 13 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, the Louisiana Long-
Arm Statute.' Section (A) of that statute continues to list eight specific
activities which, if performed by a nonresident, would enable a Louisiana
court to exercise personal jurisdiction. However, a section (B) has been
added providing that:
In addition to the provisions of Subsection A, a court of this
state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on
any basis consistent with the constitution of this state and of
the Constitution of the United States. 2
The comments to the 1987 amendment explain that its purpose is to
ensure that the Long-Arm Statute is applied so that personal jurisdiction
is not limited to the specific examples in section 3201 but extends to
the constitutional limits of due process. Now it is clear that any exercise
of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident by a Louisiana court must-
only be consistent with the United States and Louisiana constitutions.
In McBead Drilling Co. v. Kremco, Ltd.,' the Louisiana Supreme
Court recently discussed the constitutional due process standards of
personal jurisdiction as they relate to a nonresident manufacturer. One
of the defendants in McBead, Dickirson Corporation, was the nonres-
ident manufacturer as well as the seller of a drilling rig to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff alleged damage in Louisiana when the rig collapsed as a
result of design and structural defects attributable to Dickirson. Dickirson
filed an exception of lack of personal jurisdiction, asserting its nonres-
ident status.
Despite the fact that Dickirson had not regularly made or solicited
any sales to Louisiana residents (including the plaintiff), the supreme
court felt that Dickirson was subject to Louisiana jurisdiction as a
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nonresident manufacturer fitting squarely under subsection (8) of the
Long-Arm Statute. 4
Having found that the facts of the case satisfied subsection (8), the
court then considered whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
Dickirson met the standards -of constitutional due process. Now that
the Long-Arm Statute has been amended by the addition of section (B)
to Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3201, this second, constitutional analysis
by the McBead court would be the only analysis required in a case
being considered today.
Dickirson relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.5 The plaintiffs in World-
Wide argued that a state may exercise jurisdiction over the seller of a
product as long as it is foreseeable from the design and purpose of
that product that it might cause injury in such state. To this argument,
the World-Wide court responded:
[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not
the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the
forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum State are such that he should rea-
sonably anticipate being haled into court there.6
Thus, Dickirson asserted that, because its contacts with Louisiana were
so minimal, it should not have reasonably anticipated that it would be
"haled into court" in Louisiana.
The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed, drawing a distinction be-
tween the contacts of a seller and those of a manufacturer with a forum
state:
In World-Wide Volkswagen, jurisdiction over the manufacturer
was not at issue. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the
manufacturer is the only issue in the present case. In litigation
arising from a product-related injury in the forum state, there
are significant differences between the exercise of jurisdiction
over a retailer who simply sold the product locally and the
4. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from any one of the
following activities performed by the nonresident:
(8) Manufacturing of a product or component thereof which caused damage or
injury in this state, if at the time of placing the product into the stream of
commerce, the manufacturer could have foreseen, realized, expected, or antic-
ipated that the product may eventually be found in this state by reason of its
nature and the manufacturer's marketing practices.
La. R.S. 13:3201 (Supp. 1987).
5. 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980).
6. Id. at 297, 100 S. Ct. at 567.
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exercise of jurisdiction over a manufacturer whose products were
sold over a large area ....
Consideration of the relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation could lead one to reasonably conclude
that it is basically unfair to hold a local retail dealer subject
to personal jurisdiction in a remote state on a product liability
claim relating to design or manufacturing defects. But one could
also reasonably conclude on the same considerations that fairness
and substantial justice do not preclude subjecting the manufac-
turer to jurisdiction wherever the product causes damages because
of design or manufacturing defects. 7
While the McBead court was correct in not applying the holding in
World-Wide to a manufacturer, McBead should not be construed to
mean that manufacturers will be per se subject to personal jurisdiction
in Louisiana if their product causes damage there. Such a reading is
too broad.8
PRESCRIPTION AND AMENDED PLEADINGS
Traditionally, Louisiana courts have applied the general rule that
the filing of a petition interrupts prescription only as to parties named
in the suit on a timely basis absent a solidary relationship between a
timely named party and an unnamed party. 9 Attempts have been made
to overcome this rule by adding new parties through amended pleadings
filed pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1153, which
provides that:
When the action or defense asserted in the amended petition or
answer arises out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of filing the original plead-
ing. 10
However, out of concern that the policy underlying prescription
would be undermined, the courts have been reluctant to permit amended
7. McBead, 509 So. 2d at 432.
8. Cf. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County,
107 S. Ct. 1026, 1033-34 (1987) (indicating that the determination of the reasonableness
of the exercise of jurisdiction in every case will depend upon an evaluation of several
factors).
9. La. Civ. Code art. 1793 provides that suit by a solidary obligee interrupts
prescription for other solidary obligees; La. Civ. Code art. 3503 provides that when
prescription is interrupted against one solidary obligor, it is interrupted against all solidary
obligors.
10. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1153.
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pleadings adding claims by or against new parties to relate back where
new and separate causes of action were being added."
While this policy added simplicity to application of principles of
prescription, it was felt to be harsh and inequitable in some situations.
Recently, in Ray v. Alexandria Mall, 2 and Giroir v. South Louisiana
Medical Center,3 the Louisiana Supreme Court has favored a more
flexible application of article 1153, permitting a party, under certain
circumstances, by an amended petition relating back to the filing of the
original petition, to either change the identity or capacity of a party or
even add an altogether new party after prescription has run.
In Ray, the plaintiff was injured in a shopping center named "Al-
exandria Mall." Intending to sue the owner of the shopping center,
plaintiff filed a timely suit against the "Alexandria Mall," alleging it
to be a Louisiana corporation. Service was made within the prescriptive
period on the manager of the building, which actually was owned by
a partnership named "Alexandria Mall Company." The supreme court
held that an amendment by the plaintiff after the expiration of the
prescriptive period to correct the allegation as to the identity of the
owner of the building related back to the filing of the original petition.
The court based its justification for this new rule on the fact that
the substituted defendant was not prejudiced in defending the lawsuit,
because it had received notice of the suit within the prescriptive period
through service on the substituted defendant's manager, combined with
the facts that the claim alleged in the amended petition arose out of
the same transaction and occurrence pleaded in the original petition and
that the plaintiff's mistake concerning the identity of the proper defend-
ant was understandable (the owner was always the intended defendant).
Finally, the court indicated that its holding was not intended to apply
to an amendment joining a new and unrelated defendant "since this
would be tantamount to assertion of a new cause of action."' 4
Subsequently, in Giroir, the Louisiana Supreme Court utilized the
criteria in Ray to decide when the claims of new plaintiffs, joined by
an amended petition after prescription had expired, related back to the
date of the filing of the original petition by another plaintiff.
In Giroir, plaintiff timely asserted against a hospital and several
doctors his own action for the wrongful death of his wife and his wife's
survival action as the administrator of her estate. After the prescriptive
11. Guidry v. Theriot, 377 So. 2d 319 (La. 1979); Majesty v. Comet-Mercury-Ford
Co., 296 So. 2d 271 (La. 1974). The Guidry holding on prescription was repudiated by
the Louisiana Supreme Court in Louriere v. Shell Oil Co., 440 So. 2d 92, 97 (La. 1983).
2d 92, 97 (La. 1983).
12. 434 So. 2d 1083 (La. 1983).
13. 475 So. 2d 1040 (La. 1985).
14. Ray, 434 So. 2d at 1086.
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period had run, plaintiff amended his petition against the defendants
to change his capacity from that of administrator of his wife's estate
to his individual capacity, and to add the wrongful death and survival
claims of his two children as plaintiffs.
Even though the children's wrongful death and survival actions were
considered separate and distinct causes of actions from that of the
plaintiff, the court found that the timely suit of the father gave sufficient
notice to the defendant of the potential claims of his children to justify
the relation back of such claims.
The court based its decision on the facts that the claims of the
plaintiff and his children arose out of the alleged negligent medical care
to the deceased by the defendants and that the children were among
the "nucleus" of the plaintiff's family and not "wholly new or unrelated
to their father with respect to actions based on the death of their
mother." '1 5 The majority emphasized that the defendant was not prej-
udiced by the amendment because the plaintiff's properly filed suit and
the hospital's records mentioning the children placed the defendant on
timely notice of the potential claims of the new parties, and thus the
defendant could have foreseen a "reasonable possibility" that the chil-
dren would be filing a claim.
Subsequent Louisiana cases have been inconsistent in applying the
rationale of Ray and Giroir to cases where attempts were made to add
claims of new parties by amendment.
In Pontiff v. Bailey,16 Mr. & Mrs. Pontiff filed suit against Joy
Bailey, her insurer (Casualty), and others, within the prescriptive period,
for damages arising out of an automobile collision. Joy Bailey and
Casualty filed a timely reconventional demand against the Pontiffs in
that proceeding. Within the prescriptive period Joy Bailey filed, on
behalf of her minor daughter Theresa (who was a passenger with Joy
Bailey), a separate suit against the Pontiffs and their insurer. After
prescription had run, Theresa Bailey amended her suit to add Casualty
as a defendant. Casualty filed an exception of prescription to the amended
petition of Theresa Bailey, arguing that it had not been sued or given
any other formal notice within the prescriptive period by any member
of the Bailey family of a claim against Casualty arising out of the
automobile accident. The court of appeal, however, citing Ray and
Giroir, held that Theresa Bailey's amended petition naming Casualty as
a new defendant related back to the filing of her original petition.
Finding that Casualty had been sued by the Pontiffs within the pre-
scriptive period in a separate lawsuit and that it was not "unaware of
15. Giroir, 475 So. 2d at 1045.
16. 509 So. 2d 451 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
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the circumstances surrounding this accident,"' 7 the court concluded that
Casualty had been given adequate notice of Theresa Bailey's potential
claims arising out of the same accident such that it was not prejudiced
by being joined after the prescriptive period in a related lawsuit. In
effect, the Pontiff court permitted an amendment adding an entirely
new cause of action against a new defendant in Theresa Bailey's suit
when there were no facts indicating either mistaken identity or actual
notice to the defendant within the prescriptive period.
More restrictive interpretations of Ray and Giroir occurred in Ducre
v. Mine Safety. Appliances Co. 18 and Poirier v. Browning Ferris Ind.19
In Ducre, the plaintiff filed a timely suit before his death from silicosis.
More than one year following his death an amended petition was filed
adding his widow and children as new parties asserting their wrongful
death actions and substituting themselves for the deceased plaintiff.
The court held that an amendment was permissible to substitute the
wife and children to continue the deceased's action. However, it ruled
that the wrongful death actions of the new parties would not relate
back. The court, after reviewing the jurisprudence, decided that the
wrongful death actions of the new plaintiffs were different causes of
action from the survival action of the deceased and had to be filed on
a timely basis. The new plaintiffs argued" that under Giroir the defendant
was not prejudiced by the amendment asserting the wrongful death claim
because the defendant had been put on notice of the new plaintiffs'
potential wrongful death claims by its knowledge of the death of their
father. The court, however, correctly distinguished Giroir by pointing
out that in Giroir the court permitted the relation back of the wrongful
death claim of the deceased's children because their father had already
asserted a wrongful death claim against the defendants within the pre-
scriptive period. In Ducre, no member of the deceased plaintiff's family
had asserted a wrongful death claim within the prescriptive period.2 0
The court flatly rejected the plaintiff's interpretation of Giroir that the
defendant's mere knowledge of the plaintiff's death gave sufficient notice
of the potential wrongful death claims of the new parties to justify a
relation back of the amended petition.
17. Id. at 454.
18. 634 F. Supp 696 (E.D. La. 1986).
19. No. 86-955, slip op. (La. App. 3d Cir. Oct. 7, 1987).
20. The court cited with approval Revere v. Risley, 470 So. 2d 281 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1985). In Revere, the court of appeal upheld a prescription defense against the driver
of a car who intervened (after prescription had run) in the timely suit against the alleged
tortfeasor of the driver's passengers. Despite the fact that the defendants may have had
timely knowledge that the intervenor suffered injury in the accident, the intervenor's claim
"spelled out a different cause of action" from the passengers and therefore had to be
filed within the prescriptive period.
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A similar interpretation of Giroir occurred in Poirier, where a wife
asserting a post-prescription claim for loss of consortium sought to be
added as a new plaintiff by an amendment to her husband's timely suit
for personal injury. Despite the family relationship with the plaintiff,
and the fact that the amended claim arose out of the same incident
alleged in the petition, the court of appeal upheld the defendant's defense
of prescription to the amended petition. It found that the wife's claim
for loss of consortium was a separate cause of action from her husband's
claim for his injuries and had to be asserted on a timely basis. Fur-
thermore, it found that the notice criteria of Giroir was not met because
there was no actual communication of either the original plaintiff's
marital status or the wife's potential claim to the defendant within the
prescriptive period. The court held: "We do not believe that a defendant
must remain alert indefinitely to the possibility that a plaintiff might
have a spouse or children, or both, who might at some future date
bring a claim." '2'
In Randall v. Feducia,22 the Louisiana Supreme Court had an op-
portunity to clarify the Ray and Giroir holdings, but chose not to do
so. There, plaintiff sustained an injury when she stumbled at a drop-
off which was created where a public sidewalk had been constructed by
the City of Shreveport (City) adjacent to a walkway on her lessor's
property.
Plaintiff sued the lessor within the one year prescriptive period and
the lessor filed a third party demand for indemnity against the City
over one year after the accident, but within the additional ninety day
period provided by Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1067 for
the filing of incidental demands. After the expiration of the ninety day
period, plaintiff amended her suit by naming the City as a defendant
and alleging solidary liability with the lessor for her damages. After
trial, the lessor was absolved of liability, and, there being no basis for
solidarity between the City and the lessor, the City was dismissed on
the basis of prescription.
Plaintiff, however, argued that the third party demand filed by the
lessor within the additional ninety day period provided by article 1067
served to provide the City with sufficient notice of plaintiff's potential
claim and therefore that the City was not prejudiced by plaintiff's
amended petition filed after prescription had run.
The majority opinion, without discussing its rulings in Ray or Giroir,
held that article 1067 provides an extension of prescription for the benefit
of parties filing incidental demands and was not intended to benefit a
plaintiff by "resuscitating" an otherwise prescribed claim. The court
21. No. 86-955, slip op. (La. App. 3d Cir. Oct. 7, 1987).
22. 507 So. 2d 1237 (La. 1987).
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stated the rule to be that the filing of a third party demand interrupts
prescription in favor of the plaintiff only when both the original and
third party demands are filed within the prescriptive period .23
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Lemmon faulted the majority for
not permitting plaintiff's amendment against the third party defendant
to relate back pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
1153. Justice Lemmon considered that the Ray and Giroir criteria for
applying article 1153 were met because the plaintiff's claim asserted
against the City had arisen out of the same occurrence alleged in the
original petition, the city had received, through a third party demand,
timely notice of plaintiff's claim, and the City was not a wholly new
or unrelated party.
If the focal issue in Ray and Giroir is whether the defendant received
timely notice of the amended claim sufficient to eliminate prejudice in
defending against it, then Justice Lemmon's point is well taken. Article
1114 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that a certified copy of
the plaintiff's petition be served with the third party demand. Since
article 1067 requires a third party defendant to defend against a third
party demand filed within the ninety day period following the running
of prescription, it is arguable that the third party defendant is not
prejudiced by also defending against the plaintiff's claim in the same
lawsuit.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,24 the United States Supreme Court
considered, the burden of proof on a party asserting a motion for
summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Since
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 966 and 967, which govern
a motion for summary judgment, essentially track Federal Rule 56, the
Celotex decision may affect how Louisiana courts consider such motions.
In Celotex, the plaintiff alleged that her husband's wrongful death
was caused by his exposure to asbestos products manufactured or dis-
tributed by the defendants. One of the defendants, Celotex, moved for
summary judgment, asserting that during discovery the plaintiff had
failed to produce any evidence to support the allegation that the decedent
had been exposed to Celotex's products. Although the district court
granted the motion for summary judgment, the court of appeals re-
versed, 25 holding that Celotex's failure to support its motion with evi-
23. The court overruled State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Farnsworth, 425
So. 2d 827 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982), writ denied, 433 So. 2d 150 (1983), which was
a contrary holding on similar facts.
24. 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986).
25. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 48
CIVIL PROCEDURE
dence tending to negate such exposure precluded summary judgment in
its favor.
Reversing the court of appeals, the United States Supreme Court
ruled:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the
entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery
and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine
issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof
doncerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party
is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" because the non-
moving party has failed to make a sufficient showing of an
essential element of her case with respect to which she has the
burden of proof.26
Federal Rule 56 is the source of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
articles 966 and 967.27 Thus, Louisiana courts look to federal court
interpretations of Rule 56 for guidance in construing articles 966 and
967.28 The effect of the Celotex decision 'in Louisiana, therefore, may
be to switch the initial burden of proof in a motion for summary
judgment from the moving to the nonmoving party, at least in those
cases where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof on a
dispositive issue at the trial of the main action. 29
26. 106 S. Ct. at 2552-53.
27. See the comments to La. Code Civ. P. arts. 966-967.
28. The proceeding authorized in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, article 966
et seq. concerning summary judgments, is an innovation in our practice, and
there is virtually no jurisprudence from the courts of this state relating to it.
However, it was adopted with only minor, immaterial variations from Rule 56
of the Federal Rules of Practice; consequently, we are justified in considering
the jurisprudence of the federal appellate courts pertaining to its proper appli-
cation.
Kay v. Carter, 243 La. 1095, 1102, 150 So. 2d 27, 29 (1963).
29. Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2553:
In cases like the instant one, where the nonmoving party will bear the burden
of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly
be made in reliance solely on the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interro-
gatories, and admissions on file." Such a motion, whether or not accompanied
by affidavits, will be "made and supported as provided in this rule," and Rule
56(e) therefore requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and
by her own affidavits, or by the "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file," designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial."
1987]
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The Louisiana rule concerning the burden of proof in a motion for
summary judgment was most recently stated in Sanders v. Hercules Sheet
Metal, Inc.:30 On a motion for summary judgment the court must first
determine whether the supporting documents presented by the
moving party are sufficient to resolve all material fact issues.
If they are not sufficient, summary judgment must be denied.,
Only if they are sufficient does the burden shift to the opposing
party to present evidence showing that material facts are still
at issue; only at this point may he no longer rest on the alle-
gations and denials contained in his pleadings.'
The Louisiana Supreme Court stated this rule after noting that Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure articles 966 and 967 were drafted to accord
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Thus, a Louisiana court would,
after Celotex, be justified in altering the Sanders rule.
Should Louisiana courts follow the Celotex decision? If they do,
the result would appear to be consistent with the goal of curtailing
frivolous or unsupportable claims. As the Celotex court noted:
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a
disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part
of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed "to secure
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."
... Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for
the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are
adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried
to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such
claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by
the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no
factual basis.32
30. 385 So. 2d 772 (La. 1980).
31. 385 So. 2d at 775. Recent cases applying the quoted rule are Dement v. Red
River Valley Bank, 506 So. 2d 1329, 1331 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987); Hall v. Babin, 506
So. 2d 658, 660-61 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987); ERA Enterprises, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
506 So. 2d 160, 161 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987); St. Cyr v. Catherine's Stout Shoppe, 505
So. 2d 741, 742-43 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987); Daret v. Halmar Const. Co., 505 So. 2d
69, 71 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987); Stuart v. City of Morgan City, 504 So. 2d 934, 937
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1987); Mims v. Bradford, 503 So. 2d 1083, 1084 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
writ denied, 504 So. 2d 556 (1987); Barham & Churchill v. Campbell & Assocs., 503 So.
2d 576, 578-79 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 503 So. 2d 1018 (1987); University
Properties-Corp. v. Fidelity National Bank, 500 So. 2d 888, 908 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986),
writ denied, 501 So. 2d 762 (1987); Cannon v. Insured Lloyds, 499 So. 2d 978, 981-82
(La. App. 3rd Cir. 1986); Cockerham v. Winn Parish Police Jury, 494 So. 2d 1306,
1308-09 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986); Callahan v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 494 So. 2d
568, 570-71 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1986).
32. 106 S. Ct. at 2555.
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If Louisiana courts adopt the policy and rule of Celotex, the likely
result will be to streamline litigation without infringing on the rights of
parties .3
FRAGMENTARY JUDGMENTS
Louisiana courts have traditionally applied the principle that a lawsuit
should be disposed of as a single unit by one final judgment. Fragmenting
cases with multiple final judgments gives rise to inefficient, piecemeal
appeals and creates a risk of inconsistent final judgments in the same
case.3 4 However, with the increase in costly and lengthy multi-party
litigation and the liberalization of rules permitting joinder of diverse
(and even unrelated) claims, 35 it has been considered inequitable in some
instances for parties with claims and defenses clearly separable from the
others in the case to await a ruling until the entry of one final judgment
after a trial on the merits.
To strike a balance between the single unit rule and the need for
separate judgments in multi-party litigation, the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure in articles 1915 and 1971 gives the trial court limited authority
to enter partial final judgments both before and after trial on the merits.
Article 1915(3) specifies the granting of summary judgment as a
permissible partial final judgment before the trial on the merits. Insurance
companies have attempted to utilize motions for summary judgment
pursuant to article 1915(3) to obtain a partial final judgment on coverage
defenses at an early point in the proceedings. Where the insurer's motion
for summary judgment on the issue of coverage is granted, it is clear
that under article 1915 a proper partial final judgment results because
the insurer is dismissed. But where the insurer's motion for summary
judgment is denied it is equally clear that only an unappealable inter-
locutory ruling results.16
In Smith v. Hanover Ins. Co.,17 both the plaintiff and the insurer-
defendant believed there was no fact issue to be resolved and desired
33. In Celotex, a year of discovery had taken place. The Court noted:
The parties had conducted discovery, and no serious claim can be made that
respondent was in any sense "railroaded" by a premature motion for summary
judgment. Any potential problem with such premature motions can be adequately
dealt with under Rule 56(0, which allows a summary judgment motion to be
denied, or the hearing on the motion to be continued, if the nonmoving party
has not had an opportunity to make full discovery.
106 S. Ct. at 2554-55.
34. McDonald v. Book, 215 So. 2d 394 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968); Jeansonne v. Willie,
188 So. 2d 170 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
35. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 463-464, 1061.
36. La. Code Civ. P. art. 968.
37. 363 So. 2d 719 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
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an early final judgment on the coverage issue. Cross motions for sum-
mary judgment were filed on the theory that in ruling on the coverage
issue the trial court would have to grant one of the two motions and
thus an appealable final judgment would result under article 1915(3).
The court of appeal, however, found that a partial judgment granting
a summary judgment upholding coverage in favor of the plaintiff was
unauthorized. The court said that in order for a plaintiff asserting a
claim for a money judgment to assert a proper motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966,
he had to request judgment "for all or part of the relief for which he
has prayed." The court pointed out that in a case where a money
judgment was requested, a ruling on coverage only decided one legal
issue and granted none of the "relief" claimed by the plaintiff.
In 1983, article 1915 was amended by the addition of section 5
which authorizes entry of separate final judgments on the liability and
damage issues when they are tried separately. In Strauss v. Rivers,38
both the plaintiff and the insurer-defendant sought an early final judg-
ment on the coverage issue. The trial court agreed to separately try the
coverage issue pursuant to article 1915(5). After separate trial, the trial
court entered what purported to be a partial final judgment in favor
of the plaintiff upholding coverage, and the insurer appealed.
The court of appeal, citing its long-standing policy against piecemeal
appeals, dismissed the appeal finding that no appealable partial final
judgment had been rendered. It reasoned that a determination of cov-
erage alone did not amount to a final judgment on "liability" as
contemplated by article 1915(5); a finding of coverage only determined
the legal issue of whether a policy was "in effect" and not the ultimate
liability of the insurer.
The court was correct. In order for there to be an adjudication of
the "liability" of an insurer, the liability of the insured would have to
be determined also.
Despite the holdings in Smith and Strauss, appellate review of a
trial court's interlocutory ruling upholding insurance coverage, whether
raised through a motion for summary judgment or separate trial, may
be attempted through a supervisory writ. In Keiffer v. Whitaker,39 the
court of appeal granted the supervisory writ application of an insurer
whose motion for summary judgment on coverage had been denied. The
court, after stating that the ruling was unappealable, said that it was
granting the writ to consider the denial of the insurer's summary judg-
ment because there was clearly no factual dispute and "judicial efficiency
and fundamental fairness to the litigants dictate that the merits of:the
38. 501 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987).
39. 468 So. 2d 587 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
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application for supervisory writs be decided to avoid the waste of time
and expense of a possibly useless future trial on the merits as it affects
this defendent.'' °
An additional article which has provided the trial court flexibility
in entering partial final judgments is Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 1971 which authorizes the trial court to conduct a partial new
trial as to any party or part of the issues. To avoid the inequity in
certain cases of delaying the finality of the entire judgment while a
possibly lengthy partial new trial is conducted, article 1971 provides that
the granting of a new trial only suspends the finality of the entire
judgment if the trial judge so orders. Though this rule was intended to
give flexibility to the trial court in managing the lawsuit, it created a
trap for unwary parties to the judgment who permit appellate delays
to run believing that the granting of a partial new trial renders the
entire judgment interlocutory. Louisiana practitioners may have become
confused with the federal new trial procedure provided in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59. That rule is similar to article 1971 in that partial
new trials are authorized, but, unlike Louisiana procedure, the granting
of a new trial in federal court renders "nonfinal the disposition of all
issues between the parties." '4'
Noting this problem, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Thurman v.
Star Electric Supply, Inc.4 2 found a literal application of article 1971
to be unworkable.4 3 It attempted to simplify the rule by devising an
interpretation by which the finality of the portion of the judgment not
subjected to the new trial would be based on the "severability" of the
retried issues rather than by compliance with the technical necessity for
entry of an order by the trial judge holding the case in abeyance.
However, because of conceptual difficulties in determining the severa-
bility of issues involved in the new trial, the Thurman rule did not fully
eliminate problems in the application of article 1971.44
Hoping to simplify new trial procedure, the Louisiana Legislature,
by Act No. 695 of 1987, amended Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
articles 2087 and 2123 (which provide the delay periods for devolutive
and suspensive appeals) by adding to each article a section specifying
that: "When one or more parties file post-judgment motions, the
40. Id. at 588.
41. Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 150, 100 S. Ct. 2069, 2079
(1980).
42. 283 So. 2d 212 (La. 1983).
43. "This implication of the literal provisions of C.C.P. 1971 is simply not workable-
another example of the injury suffered by the practice and procedure of this state when
provisions of the federal rules are wedged into the Code of Civil Procedure." Id. at 217.
44. See Bantin v. State, 411 So. 2d 63 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1981); L'Enfant, Devel-
opments in the Law, 1981-1982 - Procedure, 43 La. L. Rev. 491, 500 (1982).
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delay periods specified herein shall commence for all parties at the time
they commence for the party whose post-judgment motion is last to be
acted upon by the trial court."
While this amendment adds needed certainty to appellate procedures,
it creates an unnecessarily inflexible rule in that it appears to remove
all discretion from the trial court in determining whether that part of
the judgment not being retried should become final. The procedure for
partial new trials would have been more workable had the new rule
provided that the filing of a post-trial motion holds the entire case in
abeyance subject to the authority of the trial judge to issue an order
in certain cases where there exists severability of the issues.
ATTORNEY'S FEES
The Louisiana Supreme Court has again stated that neither legislation
nor contractual stipulations may impair the courts' authority to inquire
into the reasonableness of attorney's fees. In Central Progressive Bank
v. Bradley,45 the Louisiana Supreme Court decided that, despite language
in Louisiana Civil Code article 2000, "the prohibition against a lawyer
accepting a 'clearly excessive fee' found in Disciplinary Rule 2-106 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, [sic] cannot be abrogated by
a provision in a note fixing the amount of attorney fees as a percentage
of the amount to be collected." 46
Similarly, in City of Baton Rouge v. Stauffer Chemical Co.,47 the
Louisiana Supreme Court held, "The prohibition against a lawyer ac-
cepting a 'clearly excessive fee' cannot be abrogated 'by a law fixing
the amount of attorney fees as a percentage of the amount to be
collected. Despite such a law, the courts may inquire into the reason-
ableness of such a fee." '48 Stauffer Chemical involved Louisiana Revised
Statutes 47:1512 which contains a ten-percent attorney's fees provision.
In both Bradley and Stauffer Chemical, the Louisiana Supreme Court
relied on Disciplinary Rule 2-106, which provides guidelines for a lawyer
in his assessment of a fee, and on Louisiana Constitution article V,
section 5(B), which grants to the supreme court exclusive original ju-
risdiction of disciplinary proceedings against a member of the bar. Thus,
if some specific amount, based upon a percentage stated in a note or
in a statute, is to be automatically allowed as attorney's fees without
judicial review, Disciplinary Rule 2-106 and Louisiana Constitution article
V, section 5(B) must be amended. That may not be desirable. After
45. 502 So. 2d 1017 (La. 1987).
46. Id.
47. 500 So. 2d 397 (La. 1987).
48. Id at 401.
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all, why should a fee be in any amount greater than what is reasonable?
ARBITRATION
Arbitration is growing in popularity because it typically provides a
more rapid, less formal, and less expensive means of resolving disputes
than a judicial forum. However, when parties agree to arbitration, they
are presumed to accept the risk that arbitrators are fallible and may
make procedural and substantive mistakes of either fact or law, which
can be submitted for judicial review only on very restricted grounds: 49
The Louisiana Arbitration Statute embodies this policy. 50 It provides
that a party may apply for judicial confirmation of an arbitration award
and the court "shall" confirm the award unless it is vacated, modified,
or corrected under the specific grounds specified in the statute.,' Aside
from partiality, fraud, and corruption, the statute authorizes a court to
vacate an arbitration award on the basis of procedural and evidentiary
deficiencies in the proceedings where they result from "misbehavior"
by the arbitrator.5 2 Judicial modification of the substantive content of
arbitration awards is likewise severely restricted to correct (i) material
miscalculation in figures, or some other mistake in the description of
the person, thing, or property subject to award, or (ii) an arbitrator's
award which has gone beyond the scope of the matter submitted. 3
Recent cases indicate that Louisiana courts intend to vigorously enforce
these restrictions on judicial review while maintaining some flexibility
for making necessary exceptions.
In St. Tammany Manor v. Spartan Building Corp. ' after a con-
struction contract dispute was submitted to arbitration, an award to one
of the parties included interest calculated from the date of substantial
completion of the contract. The aggrieved party, believing that the
arbitrator had erred in not awarding interest from the date of the
arbitrator's award, filed suit for judicial modification of the award, on
the basis of "material miscalculation in figures."*
The supreme court ruled that such an alleged error was not a
"miscalculation in figures" but was instead a challenge to the arbitrator's
decision on the merits of the controversy. The court refused to substitute
'its conclusion for that of the arbitrator,"'" emphasizing that judicial
49. Firmin v. Garber, 353 So. 2d 975 (La. 1977).
50. La. R.S. 9:4201-4217 (1983).
51. La. R.S. 9:4209 (1983).
52. La. R.S. 9:4210 (1983).
53. La. R.S. 9:4211 (1983). Those restrictions are similar to those set forth in 9
U.S.C. § 11 (1982).
54. 509 So. 2d 424 (La. 1987).
55. Id. at 426, quoting Firmin, 353 So. 2d at 977.
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authority to review arbitration awards should be strictly confined to the
grounds specified in the Louisiana Arbitration Statute even where error
appeared.
In I.D.C. Inc. v Natchitoches Dev. Co.,56 a land owner and his
contractor submitted to arbitration their dispute over the contractor's
claim for the unpaid contract price. The arbitration panel ruled in favor
of the contractor, and when the contractor sought judicial confirmation
of the award the owner filed objections based on alleged substantive
errors by the arbitrator. After the trial court summarily confirmed the
arbitration award, the owner appealed. The court of appeal refused to
even address the merits of the matter, finding instead that it was so
well settled in Louisiana that courts would not review the type of merits-
related issues raised by the owner that the appeal was frivolous. Ac-
cordingly, the court awarded attorney's fees to the contractor. This
appears to be the first reported Louisiana appellate case in which sanc-
tions were imposed for a groundless objection to confirmation of an
arbitration award. In view of the increasing number of such unwarranted
judicial challenges, imposition of sanctions may be the way to properly
implement compliance with the clear policy of the statute.
In Congregation of the Holy Family v. Mickey Construction Co.,"
the court was asked to vacate an arbitration award because the arbitrator
had permitted the dilatory filing of a counterclaim, refused to hear
testimony of an important witness, and made prejudicial comments
during the proceedings such as calling one of the witnesses "an old
fogey." The court's authority to consider such improper procedures was
challenged based on the absence of any specific provision in the Louisiana
arbitration statute. The trial court, affirmed by the court of appeal,
vacated the award finding that the procedures of the arbitrator amounted
to "misbehavior." In support of its decision, the court of appeal quoted
Civil Code article 3112 to the effect that in arbitration the parties "must
make known their claims, and prove them in the same manner as a
court of justice." '5 8 While it appears from the facts recited in the opinion
that the court was justified in finding that the procedures of the arbitrator
amounted to "misbehavior," its reference to article 3112 should not be
construed to mean that judicial determination of "misbehavior" is meas-
ured by strict compliance with judicial procedure. There is no requirement
under Louisiana law that arbitrators have legal training or that judicial
procedures be strictly followed. To properly implement the arbitration
statute, courts cannot vacate arbitration awards solely because of non-
56. 482 So. 2d 958 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
57. 500 So. 2d 802 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
58. Id at 804.
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compliance with judicial procedure. 9 If arbitrators are not the final
judge of their own proceedings, they, become nothing more than an
added and unnecessary step in the course of litigation.
In Standard Coffee Serv. Co. v. Preis,60 an employee and his em-
ployer submitted to arbitration their dispute over the validity of an
employment contract providing restrictions on the employee's post-em-
ployment right to solicit and/or sell products to the employer's cus-
tomers. The arbitration award held the contract to be a nonsolicitation
provision enforceable as a matter of Louisiana law. The employee re-
quested the court to vacate the award on the basis that the arbitrators
had erred in not finding the contractual provision to be a post-em-
ployment noncompetition restriction unenforceable under Louisiana law.
The court of appeal, while acknowledging that it had no specific statutory
authority to vacate the arbitration award on such grounds, nevertheless
assumed such inherent authority because the contractual provision was
void as a matter of Louisiana law. The court emphasized that restrictions
on a court's authority to review a request to vacate an arbitration award
based on factual and legal errors in an arbitrator's interpretation of a
contract did not prevent it from denying enforcement of an arbitration
award upholding a void contract. This result appears correct and is
consistent with decisions in other jurisdictions. 61
59. There is no legal restriction which prevents parties to arbitration from agreeing
to be bound by judicial procedures. Housing Auth. v. Henry Ericsson Co., 2 So. 2d
195, 201 (La. 1941).
60. 499 So. 2d 1314 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
61. 5 Am. Jur. 2d § 168; Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 386 N.Y.S. 2d 831, 353 N.
E. 2d 793 (1976).
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